Chapter Six

RELATING SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY

In the preceding chapter, I interpreted the efforts of Capra and Bohm as using religious ideas in physics. Other people might cry foul; they insist there should be no traffic of knowledge between the two realms. This raises the relation between science (say, the physical sciences) and religion (in particular, theology). We need to elaborate the observation that people like Bohm and Capra are moving ideas between the two subject areas. How can there be such a movement without defiling the integrity of either science or theology? There ought to be good reasons for it happening. Is there a more general framework for the science-religion relation into which we could place Bohm's efforts? A constructive understanding of the science-theology relation could help answer these matters. This would help us understand what Bohm is doing, and also lay a base for further exploring this movement of ideas.

There have at times been hot debates over the relation between scientific knowledge and theology. The interest of theologians is now with other areas, for several reasons. The science-religion relation is an old issue over which many people have set stands, stalling progress. The challenge of the strong and defiant empiricist-positivist understandings of science has melted. Moreover, the inner-meaning or hermeneutical-existential approaches to theology have gained in popularity. The pendulum has swung to social and political issues or, within other religious movements, to conservatism. These all require theology largely to ignore the knowledge of the natural sciences.<307>

The challenge that is the relation between science and theology still exists. It reflects directly the dispute between the secular and the religious worlds. Further, it is an issue underlying several present movements in theology. Such is the case in developing a method by which theology might operate. It also keeps cropping up with urgent environmental issues and ethical questions like genetic engineering. It is, therefore, essential to much theological thinking.

CLASSIFYING SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY RELATIONS

One way to address the relation between science and theology is to look at how people have understood it, and from this build a general approach. It may then be easier to discuss a model for the relation that serves the purposes outlined above. Two efforts at digesting and classifying this broad field are useful starting points.<308>

The first comes from William Austin. He divides science-theology relations into two classes, starting with those that see them as mutually irrelevant.<309>

Of these, he first singles out instrumentalist arguments that deny scientific and/or religious statements are factual. Second, he isolates what he calls two-realms arguments. These assume scientific and religious statements support or are in harmony with each other because they are about different things. Austin takes the popular complementarity model of Donald MacKay as an example of this approach.

Austin concludes that none of the arguments successfully shows (natural) science to be irrelevant to theology in principle.

Relevance has different meanings for Austin.

(a) A collection of scientific statements has direct relevance to a theological doctrine if it or its negative implies the doctrine. An example is the comparison between the religious belief that all people have descended from Adam and Eve, and the science of biology. From biology, scientists conclude there was no one couple from which humanity descends.

(b) If theologians and scientists offer alternative, apparently competing, explanations of the same data, then Austin calls the relevance quasi-direct. The competing explanations offered by Paley and Darwin for the way organisms have adapted to their environments is an example.

(c) Finally, Austin cites three ways in which science might have indirect relevance for theology. The first is when theologians adopt a scientifically acceptable metaphysics, such as process philosophy. Second, theologians might adopt a method similar to science's. They might also try to structure theology as though it were a science. In the third way, theologians draw suggestions from the method and content of science.<310>

Austin says the arguments claiming science is irrelevant for theology are not successful. This strikes commentators in different ways. Richard Rubble says Austin wants science to help theology exclude its unscientific ideas. We can cut scientific intrusions out of theology, Rubble suggests, by redoing theology so science is irrelevant for it.<311> This is not what Austin says. His point is not that science is relevant (in some way or other) for theology. In fact, Austin suggests theologians shelve this question - but this dismays Donald Musser. To him, theology cannot recapture its aims by ignoring science.<312>

Harold Oliver's classification of the major twentieth-century views on the science-theology relation adds to Austin's work.<313> Oliver first singles out the conflict theory in which science and religion have alternative or rival theories. This is Austin's quasi-direct relevance of science and theology for each other.

Second is the compartment theory. Science and religion cannot be rivals because they do not refer to the same things. Oliver senses two types of compartment theories. One thinks science refers to the physical world and religion to a spiritual world. The other brings the two into harmony by insisting that only science is factual. These two classes are like Austin's two-realms and instrumentalist arguments.

Austin says complementarity is a two-realms irrelevance argument. On the other hand, complementarity is Oliver's third type of relation between science and theology, and it is a type of relevance.<314> The difference between Austin and Oliver is important. It points to a confusion about what MacKay's complementarity actually says.<315>

I want a context in which to discuss the relation between Bohm's physics and religion, and for work extending Bohm's. Complementarity is a good place to start. This use of complementarity has been around for over half a century. A central figure in physics' use of complementarity, Bohr, suggested its use in theology.<316> Still now it is an important idea in many writers' relating of scientific and theological concepts.<317> Scholars appear to have paid it more indepth attention than any other model for the relation. Since the 1950s, MacKay tried both to popularize it and to make it rigorous. One of the latest contributions is Helmut Reich's.<318>

Yet there are persistent problems with complementarity, right through to Reich. Writers often use complementarity carelessly. They seldom ask the key question: "Does this model for the science-theology relation picture them as necessary and also as relevant for each other?" Unfortunately, many such models ignore the latter half of the question. Then they help theologians avoid the conflicts between theology and science. Examining MacKay's and Reich's proposals might help clarify how or whether to use complementarity to relate science and theology.

The sections that follow expand on this question and explore complementarity with it in mind. Then I will suggest a model that I think provides a better context for extending Bohm's ideas.

THE RELEVANCE OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY FOR EACH OTHER

My key question for a science-theology relation assumes they are relevant for each other. The type of relevance meant here is, in Austin's terms, direct or quasi-direct. More needs saying about this relevance.

The relation between science and theology has been at the center of many conflicts. Usually science challenges theology (cosmology, evolution, psychology, etc.), theology responds defensively, and science proceeds on its own way. Then theology alters itself by adjusting to the scientific developments. Alternatively, it redefines itself as far from science as possible.<319> The last of these is the usual response by theologians this century. Science and theology go from being mutually relevant to being irrelevant.

In Western thought, the distinction between the subjective and objective reflects the science and theology conflict. The positivist extreme assigns science to the objective, theology to the subjective, and denounces the latter as meaningless. Most theologians respond by insisting theology has a world of meaning - one different from science's. With these different worlds of meaning, theologians do not have to connect science and theology. They are giving into positivism and playing down the relevance of religion for scientific culture. Hence, their theology is less able to speak to a life based on modern technology. They are not providing an authoritative moral direction for science and technology. Further, they are weakening theology's claim that it deals with all aspects of life, not just with its meaning. Theologians could, in effect, lose religion by trying to save it.<320>

Sociobiology provides an example of a current clash. Several sociobiologists claim their scientific theory explains morality, including the nature of the conscience. Human genes are responsible for morality (though culture also has a role). Ethics come from biology. Not surprisingly, sociobiology conflicts with many theologies. No longer can we look upon morality as the wishes of a supremely moral God whom we may or may not chose to follow. No longer can we look upon conscience as the voice of a supernatural God. The scientific theory contradicts the theological belief.<321>

In this case, science and theology have a quasi-direct relevance. They conflict. Trying to solve this or any other clash between science and theology may have serious results. It may mean the initial theories need changing. In the extreme, conflicts suggest abandoning one or other of the trouble makers.

If a model for the science-theology relation helps theologians escape the conflicts without engaging their beliefs, it drives wedges more deeply between the disciplines. Science will continue its way without theology; theology will continue its, only sometimes nodding to science. Fact and value will be further apart.

To avoid this means emphasizing the relevance of science and theology for each other. It means actively exploring their points of contact. Conflicts need resolving, but not in ways that make them more irrelevant for each other. A model for the science-theology relation should not be ambivalent about this.

COMPLEMENTARITY

MacKay's Model of Complementarity

Bearing my key question in mind, I now turn to complementarity models. The first to consider is MacKay's.

Complementarity has proved useful in helping understand the connections between various theological ideas.<322> MacKay often used it to defend Christianity against those who claim nature only contains mechanisms. He also used it to discuss such apologetic subjects as freedom and determinism, and intelligence and consciousness in human beings and machines.<323> It has proved a useful and common tool, too, in many popular and academic statements on the science-religion relation.<324> Holmes Rolston uses it and so writes that neither science nor religion depends logically on the other. "Yet neither, despite the integrity of each, is complete without the other. Science discovers intelligible causes, but limps at discovering meanings; religion discovers intelligible meanings, but defers to science about causes."<325>

Complementarity became famous because physics uses it to understand, for instance, the wave and particle natures of light. Unfortunately, extending its use from physics to relate science and theology runs into trouble.<326> Therefore, MacKay insists his use of complementarity comes from a definition that does not depend on its use in physics. He even shows the physics' use can come from his.<327>

MacKay says two descriptions of a common reference are complementary when three conditions apply. First, both descriptions refer to the same things. Second, each in principle can account for every object and event in the common reference. Third, the statements they make are different because their definitions are not the same or they use concepts differently. One excludes significant aspects of the other. Thus, complementary explanations or descriptions start by emphasizing different aspects of the reference using different types of ideas.<328>

MacKay offers a strict condition for all pairs of would-be complementary statements: the alteration or absence of one requires a change in the other. He also says a blanket use of complementarity empties it of meaning. It must be clear what would make two statements not complementary.<329>

A scientific and a theological description or explanation of an event are, according to MacKay, complementary. Take evolution as an example. Both accounts seek to understand such facts as fossil remains, adaptation to environments, the diversity of yet relations between species, and so on. That is, both accounts refer to the same objects and events. They are trying to understand the same occurrences. This is the first requirement for complementarity.

Suppose the theological account accepts the scientific one. Suppose it then goes further by saying the scientific is a description of the way God is creating. The theory of evolution describes how God is acting to produce the diverse range of species. This satisfies the second requirement for complementarity. In principle, each accounts for everything in the common reference.

The theological account may continue by saying God intends something by creating with evolution. It might say God's purpose in so creating the human species was to introduce love into the world. Under the influence of love, all of creation would come together to God's glory. This theological account is different from the scientific. It goes beyond the scientific in seeking the latter's significance by using such unscientific ideas as God and love. This is the third and final requirement for complementarity. The scientific and theological accounts of evolution are complementary.

They are complementary in one of the two ways MacKay isolates. While in some pairs of descriptions both are on the same level, in others they are on different levels. According to MacKay, science and theology are complementary in this second sense. Their relation is not symmetrical, forming a hierarchy of explanations. The explanations higher up on the hierarchy need those lower down, which in contrast do not require those higher up. The religious description of events goes beyond the scientific description of them by giving them meaning.

The descriptions of operating a computer, one from a mathematician and another from an electronics engineer, are also complementary in this hierarchical sense. MacKay writes that the engineer can describe an electronic activity in the computer if the mathematician detects something significant coming from it. The converse, he suggests, is not true. That the engineer can describe an activity of the computer electronically, does not mean it has mathematical meaning.<330> There are many examples of complementary explanations that are hierarchical. Another mentioned by MacKay is the different accounts of religious conversion experiences. From a theological point-of-view, they are the work of the Holy Spirit. From a psychological point-of-view, they are natural. MacKay also thinks the use of the term in quantum physics is not hierarchical.

The problem of relating different ways of thinking does not arise just between science and theology. It exists as well between indigenous religions and Western thought forms. In fact, it arises between all systems of thought based on different ideas or standards. The problem is most obvious between powerful and widely-held systems that share few assumptions, such as between science and traditional Christianity. MacKay's model is only one of many solutions to this more general problem of conceptual relativism.<331>

Problems with MacKay's Complementarity

Despite the promise shown by MacKay's model for the science-theology relation, it faces several problems. From those mentioned in publications, Austin probably raises the most serious.<332> For instance, to fulfill MacKay's conditions for complementary descriptions means distinguishing something objectively-given from something theory-laden or subjectively-influenced. This is impossible.

Beyond these difficulties, MacKay's model is confusing. Does it emphasize the differences between the scientific and the theological approaches? Alternatively, does it emphasize their common ground? Is it a position in which science and theology are mutually relevant or irrelevant?

MacKay's model does require theology and science to have something in common. It says a change in one requires changing the other. It also says science and theology are talking about some of the same realities.<333>

On the other hand, complementary pairs can be completely different. In mathematics, for example, the complement of a set is all those points not in it. There are no points in common to a set and its complement. Similarly for complementary angles. The pairs in these examples do not overlap. The complement "fills up" to complete, as the dictionary would say. This suggests science and theology cannot overlap. In relating them, all we can do is change their common boundary. Thus, complementarity for the science-theology relation also suggests they are completely different and mutually irrelevant.<334>

MacKay's complementarity emphasizes the irrelevance by saying science and theology are complementary in a hierarchical sense. They are on different levels. The model thus concentrates on their lack of interactions. It says the function of theology is to add meaning to the science. With this position, it is unclear how theological accounts could have any impression on the scientific if this is all they do. Hierarchical complementarity stops theology giving a science data, directions toward worthwhile areas of study, or criteria for accepting or rejecting a physical theory.<335> Neither does it have a place for direct conflicts.

The word hierarchy may irritate the problem. This is because MacKay's use implies interactions only from the lower levels on the upper (science on theology). Similarly, the word level is troublesome because it implies parallel nonintersecting planes.<336>

MacKay's model of complementarity therefore presents a confused picture about the relevance of science and theology for each other. We do not know whether he is wanting their relevance or their irrelevance. As a result, Austin and Oliver classify the model differently.

Other writers also feel this confusion. J.A. Cramer has to reject religious explanations if he is to follow MacKay's model. He starts by thinking the two are competing and the scientific is complete. He wants to accept the simpler of them. Since they occupy separate niches - "They cannot conflict because they cannot contact" - and are equally true, the religious must go. He does not like rejecting the religious and so concludes that his initial assumption is wrong. Scientific knowledge must be incomplete. MacKay replies that Cramer has misunderstood him. The situation requires different levels of explanation, each in its own way complete.<337> This response probably does not satisfy the critic or remove the inquirer's confusion.<338>

A way out of this problem with relevance is to question the adequacy of MacKay's model. It cannot handle the problem of whether it is emphasizing the relevance or the irrelevance of science and theology for each other.

The reason for the difficulty with MacKay's model may be that its original purpose was to answer something other than the relevance question. The dictionary definition of complementary is "serving to complete."<339> Thus, the word complementarity suggests an adequate description of a situation requires both science and theology. MacKay's intention for the model, therefore, was perhaps only to say both are necessary for a complete account.<340> This makes sense. It was important for MacKay to justify the existence of theology during the reign of a more positivist understanding of science.<341>

This is probably not the issue for those now interested in the science-theology relation. Most of us accept the need for both. We think they are mutually relevant and we want to know what they share and over what it is they clash. How to handle clashes is central because it tells much about their points in common.

As a simple picture of the science-theology relation, MacKay's model stretches too far when looked at in depth.<342> Yet I do not want to undermine the importance of MacKay's ideas. To his evangelical peers they must be radical. For instance, he makes evolution and divine creation compatible.<343> Further, MacKay assumes theology and science have the same subject matter, namely the world we experience. This is an example of the evangelical movement's adopting secular thinking. He has removed the other-world from the subject matter of theology.<344>

Reich's Complementarity<345>

Making science and theology relevant for each other is the touchstone I use for any proposed relation between them. MacKay's complementarity fails on this. What of Reich's complementarity model for the science-theology relation?

Reich wants to manage statements that appear contradictory, especially those involving religion. He favors a rational way of explaining why there really is no contradiction. Complementarity is such a rational approach. It is a form of thought, an epistemology, that tries to relate several explanations of the same things.<346>

Reich's complementary thinking makes sense of noncompatible theories by coordinating them. (He prefers to call apparent contradictions noncompatible. In this way he does not prejudge them to be compatible or incompatible.) It helps noncompatible theories illuminate and set limits on each other when describing or explaining the same reference.<347> To think in a complementary way, we need to do the following.

(1) Tentatively define and clarify the reference we want to explain or describe.

(2) List all the explanations and descriptions made from different standpoints, perhaps add others, and deal with conflicts among them.

(3) Find the settings in which the items in the above list (2) explain or describe the reference or parts of it. If we still do not fully understand the reference, we should take the list as an analogy or approximation.

(4) Find and describe links between items on the list.

(5) Find out how much each item's contribution to the explanation or description depends on how strong others are.

(6) Develop a complete theory or sketch that explains all the details of the reference for different situations.

(7) Explain any changes made to the meaning of the ideas used in understanding the reference and the new theory or sketch.<348>

There are for Reich two types of complementarity.<349> The relation between science and theology is of what he calls the circular type.<350> It requires a long circular process of thinking. One questions the need for the process, and asks why understanding each complementary aspect needs the other. Then, one looks at corrections to the initial assumptions because of insights gained in this process. In circular complementarity, "the two explanations illuminate, rather than limit, each other."<351>

Reich's work goes beyond the above. With Fritz Oser, he has developed and tested a developmental model for complementary thinking.<352> They chart the responses to problems that may call for complementarity. In particular, they chart the differences in responses from children through to adults. As a way of thinking, complementarity develops through stages and fully emerges later in an individual's life, if at all.<353> It is the highest level of reasoning. One must use it, Reich says, for reaching higher stages of religious development.<354>

Problems with Reich's Complementarity

In Reich's scheme, are science and theology relevant for each other? Can they interact? Might they debate and resolve points of disagreement? If Reich's device is confusing on this score, it might be a flawed way for relating science and theology.

For simplicity's sake, I will say there are two phases where Reich's scheme addresses conflicts. The first starts with the second stage of Reich's outline of what complementary thinking requires ("list all the explanations...deal with conflicts among them"). It continues to the fourth stage where he seeks links between the descriptions. The second phase is the sixth stage where he develops "a complete theory or sketch that explains all the details of the reference for different situations." These two phases could lead to different ways for handling conflicts.

First, theology and science should settle their conflicts. Phase one of Reich's scheme is explicit about this. He even requires linking the various descriptions.

Second, one could take Reich's scheme to say science and theology need not interact.<355> Phase two of his scheme asks us to build a complete theory. It is here I feel there is a danger of glossing over differences (perhaps overlooked or intentionally ignored earlier in the complementarity program). For instance, Reich asks: "Is it not easier to study these [noncompatible] features separately in differing circumstances?"<356> Studying each feature separately and then bringing them together perhaps to conflict, is one matter. Studying them separately and keeping them separate is another. Though Reich may not intend it, building a complete theory may permit the latter.

At least three aspects of Reich's presentation lead me to suspect this.

(1) The language Reich uses does not take full account of what might happen when ironing out the conflicts in phase one.

Consider, for instance, wrestling with the creation/evolution question. Working through Reich's complementarity program soon raises the conflict between Genesis creation and evolution. The program suggests solving this. Usually, one does so by saying religion is about meaning and science about fact. This makes theology irrelevant to the scientific theory.<357> The alternative is to change the scientific, or the religious accounts, or both, to put them in harmony.

The latter type of changes are major and Reich does not consider the weight of this.

(2) Quantum physics' theory of complementarity, closely related to Reich's, also says one can hide conflicts with complementarity. It holds disputants apart, practically isolating them. Couch this idea, for instance, as an uncertainty relation. While a quantum-level particle may have two properties such as position and momentum, we cannot know both with precision. In practice only one of the properties is there. Thus, using a scientific explanation for a situation virtually rules out a theological one. The same holds in reverse.

(3) The third reason for my thinking one can interpret Reich as saying theology and science need not interact is more subtle.

Complementarity does not emphasize the need to relate science and theology directly, where one affects the content of the other. Rather, their relation lies in their being part of a larger complementary scheme where their respective theories may be in harmony. Like an overpass on a highway, complementarity may stop collisions by having the parties pass over and under each other. This is the danger. They could be separate, on different levels.

Thus Reich can write the following when trying to clarify science and theology's interaction. "We need to distinguish between the idea that science and theology are not unrelated and (on the other hand) the idea that the nature of their inter-relation is causal."<358> He says his complementarity research suggests the former. On the other hand, the latter resembles relevance. Complementarity may, therefore, want science and theology to have little to do with each other.

The adolescents he interviews and finds to have the highest level of development, do link scientific and theological explanations. They coordinate competing explanations. For each of them, however, the worlds of science and theology are separate. Reto has them in different dimensions. Bernhard and Renate hold a deism where God acted at the beginning and the world now evolves by itself according to its natural laws. Science has to do with finding "one's way around this world" and religion with living "a truly human life." This is René's view. Victor sees them as different worldviews - they are different ways humans think and have different functions. All of these suggest science and theology can go their independent ways.<359>

The avoidance also surfaces when Reich defines complementarity. He wants to use it to make sense of apparent contradictions. This suggests he has already judged the contradictions not to be real before he starts. Apparent means there is in truth no contradiction. He prefers to say noncompatible theories, but this is also misleading. Before he applies complementarity, he knows there is a chance of the theories contradicting each other or being incompatible. That is why he applies it. Thus, we have to decide the contradiction is unimportant or does not really exist before we start.

To make it suitable for the science-theology relation, Reich qualifies his basic model to become circular complementarity. This could be like a spiral. Continually moving from science to theology and back again, the relation may never allow the two sides to relate directly. There is illumination but no limiting.

The above three points say one can read Reich as thinking science and theology are separate and should not interact. This contradicts his also saying they should resolve their differences and link their explanations. Thus, his model is confusing on this important matter.

Some people do reach the level of complementary thinking. But this does not mean complementarity is better for approaching an apparent contradiction than is some other way. (What does better mean here anyway?) Similarly, while Reich lists conditions necessary for using complementarity, he should provide criteria for when to adopt it. He has not discussed in detail why we should use complementarity to relate science and theology. Further, what are the criteria for not relating explanations in a complementary way although they satisfy Reich's requirements? We could use his scheme on all sorts of conflicting statements, perhaps inappropriately.

What is Reich's motivation for promoting complementarity? He appears to feel it represents the highest form of religious development because it unifies one's beliefs, metaphysical systems and activities.<360> This raises further matters.

(a) The idea of what is the highest form of religious development is value-laden. Reich might discuss these values.

(b) Why does complementarity reach this aim of unity better than other approaches?

(c) Is adopting complementarity in fact an act of maturity? Or does it come from the frustration of a person wanting unity yet facing contradictions? If the person settles conflicts by splitting science from theology, perhaps they want peace and quiet rather than threatening debate. Reich offers complementarity "for resolving the many perceived contradictions and paradoxes that characterize religious life".<361>

(d) People might also use complementarity to relate science and theology because it reflects what culture says is and relevance. It may, therefore, be better to avoid the term when relating theology and science, and not to use any model that is like physics' complementarity. The reason for using it may not be because it is the most mature.

(e) The mark of maturity may not be using complementarity. Rather it could be distinguishing between what should rightfully be a complementary relation and what should not.

I have raised several doubts about Reich's complementarity program, focussing especially on its confusion over relevance. Reich could remove these difficulties from his program. On the other hand, physics' use of complementarity has precedence and does avoid conflict and relevance. It may, therefore, be better to avoid the term when relating theology and science, and not to use any model that is like physics' complementarity.

THE LADDER MODEL FOR THE SCIENCE-THEOLOGY RELATION

Judging by his papers, Reich's concern is with religious education and the religious beliefs of young people. He wants them to develop an intelligent approach to the conflicts between science and religion. Using complementarity they can, he believes, avoid contradictions and conflict. Then they may not fall to skepticism and reject religion out of hand.<362>

The thorn in complementarity, both as a term borrowed from physics and as the program Reich outlines, is its confusion over relevance. At issue is admitting the conflicts between science and religion and building on their common features. In short, allowing them to be mutually relevant is the problem. Secular young people may not even consider religion, let alone become skeptical and reject it, without this relevance and the conflict and contradictions entailed. Any model for the science-religion relation should show no confusion over this. It is better to drop complementarity and use a model where there is not only mutual illumination, but also limiting.<363>

There are many ways to proceed beyond complementarity. Theoretically there are several possible relations between science and theology. To start with there are the three directions of relevance and irrelevance: mutual, science to theology, and theology to science. Various sorts of relevance would compound the list.<364> Furthermore, beyond acknowledging an in-principle relevance of some sort is the added step of putting it into effect. It may not be important enough to pursue at present.

Science is relevant for theology. This especially appears in theology's claim that God is acting on or in the world. If God created the world and sustains it in existence, then saying how God does this is open to scientific scrutiny. Such statements must refer to events that are not spiritual - and as such touch some scientific discipline. The theologian might further claim God intervenes in the world of natural causes. Such claims may provide material for scientific study because they deal with the world of science. For example, an evangelist's insistence that God stopped a hurricane hitting an area may conflict with a meteorologist's explanation. Theology could touch many sciences. That people have religious experiences, as another example, falls under the scrutiny of psychology. Physics, sociology, history, hermeneutics, anthropology, are other obvious examples.

There are, therefore, places where science does or could have a bearing on theology. In general, I seek to understand the relevance of science and theology for each other. I seek their integration. Relevance and integration are similar. Science and theology are mutually irrelevant when there can be no contact between them. They are mutually relevant when there can be, in principle, exchanges of ideas or methods. Conflicts, and support of one's ideas by the other, are other indicators. Integration is a positive and active form of relevance. There is with integration a sharing of methods and ideas. Any potential point of conflict leads to discussion and a decision on a common stand. One does not have to take over the other, and the two do not have to combine so they lose their individual identities.

Opening the door for a science-theology integration was the change in the philosophy of science often associated with Thomas Kuhn. It moved away from a strongly empirical understanding of the doing of science toward a more person-involving and subjective one.<365> To follow this revision is to recognize subjective as well as objective factors operating in science.<366>

This revolution in the philosophy of science takes us further. It allows us to say both theology and science are inventive human enterprises, co-workers at knowing. The writings of Michael Polanyi inspire this attitude. He isolates the making of a discovery as the key to all knowing and emphasizes tacit knowledge. From his idea of creating, we can build a theory of knowledge that challenges the object/subject division. All acts of knowing are for him facets of the same thing, on a continuum. Such a position can make theology more confident of knowing truth in its own proper way. It is a way similar to science's.<367>

Current philosophy of science allows thinking of a science-theology integration. Grasping the opportunity, I wish to propose what I call the ladder model for this. To understand the model imagine a ladder standing vertically on the ground. Take the ground to be the common reference of science and theology, namely the real world, its contents and events. Science and theology are the two vertical poles of the ladder. In trying to understand reality we create models and systems of thought. These build from our experience of reality. They rise like the poles of a ladder from the ground on which it stands.<368> The rungs of the ladder are what science and theology have in common. They depict what is the same in their knowledge and assumptions. They are those matters that both know to be true about reality in general and about the particular situation under consideration.

The obvious differences in function and content between science and theology are easy for present-day theology to acknowledge. In the past, theology has over-reacted in the face of science, its method and world-view. On the other hand, it was common for scientists at the time of Newton to have theological questions at the front of their minds. They worked their theologies and their scientific theories in together. Newton himself is a prime example. It was shortly after this time that philosophical developments arising from his physics attacked theology. The rise of evolutionary theory and the science of psychology further assaulted it. Theology lost and retreated. It now shies clear of making factual statements. It stresses the differences between science and theology.

While acknowledging the differences, the ladder model suggests there is ideally one system of knowledge. This system will have both its scientific and theological emphases arising from different functions. Content alone, however, does not separate them. I am imagining an integration of the scientific and theological systems of knowledge.<369>

My hope is the ladder model upholds the intentions of the complementarity model. First, science and theology have the real world as a common reference. The challenge is to admit this and to investigate the extent of their similarities. Second, they are different because their definitions and the way they use concepts are not the same. These points are probably what MacKay intended with his model.<370>

Bohm's integration of his physics and religious beliefs typify the ladder model. Both try to explain and come to terms with the world of experience from their own perspectives. They stand as two poles on the ground of experience. Yet they connect with each other in that, for instance, Bohm's physics centers on several of his religious beliefs. For Bohm, everything relates to everything else. This idea passes between the two poles or explanations via a rung of the ladder. Thus, Bohm's science and theology relate positively to each other and each informs the other. They are conversing and building an integrated science-theology explanation.<371>